

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 EA-07 AF-10 NEA-10 ERDA-05

CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07 IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02

OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06

TRSE-00 DODE-00 NSC-05 COME-00 DOTE-00 EB-07

FMC-01 CG-00 DLOS-09 OES-07 MMO-01 /141 W

-----086304 251009Z /14

P 250900Z JUN 77

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9121

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 9157

DEPT PASS TO NSC, ACDA, DOD, JCS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, XO, UR

SUBJECT: INDIAN OCEAN TALKS: ROUND THREE

### SUMMARY

IN SECOND PLENARY SESSION, US PRESENTED DEFINITIONAL MATERIAL. SOVIETS ACCEPTED PROPOSED US MAP OF INDIAN OCEAN BUT ARGUED THAT WATERS NORTH AND SOUTH OF AUSTRALIA SHOULD BE INCLUDED. MENDELEVICH PRESENTED MAJOR EXPOSITION OF SOVIET POSITION, AGAIN FAVORING DATA EXCHANGE ON A WORKING BASIS WHICH CAN BE AMENDED LATER AND AS PRELIMINARY INDICATION OF EACH SIDE'S VIEW OF FACTUAL SITUATION IN AREA. HE ACCEPTED US DEFINITION OF SHIP-DAY MEASURE, AND HE HAD NO PROBLEM IN PRINCIPLE WITH PROPOSED US DEFINITION OF PERMANENT PRESENCE, SUBJECT TO FURTHER DISCUSSION OF LENGTH OF GAP WHICH COULD BE ACCEPTED DURING ROTATION OF UNITS. HE NOTED IMPORTANCE OF TRANSITS FOR USSR AND RESERVED POSITION ON HOW LONG A SHIP COULD REMAIN IN INDIAN OCEAN AND STILL BE CONSIDERED IN TRANSIT. INDICATED US PROPOSAL OF 30-DAY PRESENCE FOR TRANSITING UNITS NEEDED MORE REFINEMENT ACCORDING TO CIRCUMSTANCES AND TYPE OF SHIP. HE CALLED FOR MORE STUDY OF WHAT CONSTITUTES AN

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"AUXILIARY," NOTING THAT SUPPORT RELATES TO SHORE FACILITIES AS WELL AS SHIPS. NOTED WITH SATISFACTION US FLEXIBILITY IN CONSIDERING MIX OF SHIP-DAYS AND TON-DAYS AS MEASURE OF PRESENCE. IN PRESENTING HIS GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF INDIAN OCEAN SITUATION, MENDELEVICH DREW ATTENTION TO DIFFERENT VIEWS OF THE TWO SIDES ON WHETHER OR NOT AN ARMS RACE IS GOING ON, INDICATING SOVIETS FEEL THAT US AND ALLIED BASE CONSTRUCTION AND EXERCISE ACTIVITY

ARE ELEMENTS OF ARMS RACE, ALTHOUGH IT "HAS NOT GONE TOO FAR."  
HE DEFINED SOVIET STRATEGIC AIMS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AS RELATED  
PRIMARILY TO SECURITY OF TRANSIT ROUTE BETWEEN EUROPEAN AND FAR  
EAST USSR. NOTED US LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN DEFENDING OIL  
ROUTES, BUT EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT US ACTIVITIES  
GO BEYOND THIS AIM TO CONSIDERATION OF INDIAN OCEAN AS AREA  
FOR DEPLOYMENT OF STRATEGIC FORCES DIRECTED AGAINST THE USSR. IN  
THIS REGARD, HE NOTED US PERIODIC DEPLOYMENT OF ATTACK CARRIERS WHOSE  
AIRCRAFT CAN REACH THE USSR FROM THE PERSIAN GULF, THE EXPANSION  
OF DIEGO GARCIA TO ACCOMMODATE B-52S AND DEVELOPMENT OF A SYSTEM  
OF US AND ALLIED BASES WHICH COULD SUPPORT SSBN DEPLOYMENTS.  
IN CLOSING, HE FOCUSED ON US CALL FOR "STABILIZATION", NOTING  
THAT IF THIS MEANS US RETAINS CAPABILITY TO CONTINUE TO DEVELOP  
STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES IN AREA WHILE RESTRICTING USSR, THEN  
AGREEMENT NOT POSSIBLE. HE STRESSED THAT THIS WAS THE CORE OF  
THE ISSUE. BUT IF BOTH SIDES DESIRE AVOID ARMS RACE, THEN  
BASIS FOR AGREEMENT EXISTS. END SUMMARY

1. PLENARY SESSION HELD 24 JUNE, CHAIRED BY AMBASSADOR WARNKE,  
WITH AMBASSADOR MENDELEVICH FOR THE SOVIET SIDE. WARNKE PRESENTED  
INFORMAL OPENING STATEMENT SETTING FORTH US VIEWS ON DEFINITION  
OF THE AREA AND MILITARY ACTIVITIES. SOVIETS RESPONDED TO MAP  
PRESENTED BY US SIDE BY NOTING THAT IT SHOULD INCLUDE WATERS TO  
NORTH AND SOUTH OF AUSTRALIA, CITING CERTAIN US AND INTERNATIONAL  
PUBLICATIONS.

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2. WARNKE PRESENTED A NUMBER OF DEFINITIONAL ISSUES, INCLUDING  
WHAT CONSTITUTES A SHIP-DAY, PERMANENT PRESENCE, TRANSITS, AND  
TYPES OF SHIPS TO BE INCLUDED IN TOTALS. NOTED SOVIET INTEREST  
IN TON-DAY MEASURE, NOT PRECLUDING ITS USE BUT NOTING THE POSSIBI-  
LITY OF A COMPROMISE COMBINING SHIP-DAY AND TON-DAY MEASURES.  
WARNKE NOTED THAT MEASURES SHOULD BE EQUALLY APPLICABLE TO  
BOTH SIDES. COMPOSITION OF US AND SOVIET PRESENCE NOT IDENTICAL,  
BUT DIFFERENCES SHOULD NOT PRECLUDE AGREEMENT. US WILLING TO  
CONSIDER NOTIFICATION OF UNITS ENTERING AND DEPARTING GEOGRAPHIC  
AREA.

3. MENDELVICH THEN LAUNCHED INTO MAJOR EXPOSITION OF SOVIET  
POSITION, STARTING FROM CONCRETE ISSUES TO THE MORE GENERAL.  
HE NOTED AT OUTSET THAT A NUMBER OF POINTS PRESENTED BY US SIDE  
COULD BE ANSWERED EASILY WHILE OTHERS CALLED FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION  
OR MORE FORMAL AGREEMENT. HE AGREED THAT EXCHANGE OF DATA SHOULD  
NOT BECOME A SUBJECT FOR NEW DISPUTES OR ARGUMENTS, AND FELT  
THAT THIS COULD BE AVOIDED IF TWO POINTS WERE KEPT IN MIND:  
(1) THAT EXCHANGE NOT BE CONSIDERED A MAJOR DIPLOMATIC ACTION  
BUT RATHER A WORKING EXCHANGE WHICH EITHER SIDE CAN AMEND OR  
CORRECT LATER; (AND (2) THAT THE DATA EXCHANGED SHOULD REFLECT  
A LEVEL OF MAGNITUDE WHICH IS NOT "PRECISE TO THE TON."

4. HE ACCEPTED US DEFINITION OF HOW SHIP DAYS MIGHT BE COUNTED. IN PRINCIPLE HE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH DEFINITION OF A PERMANENT OR CONTINUOUS PRESENCE AS COMPOSED OF VARIOUS SHIPS OF SAME CLASS ON A ROTATING BASIS, BUT WOULD WANT FURTHER DEFINITION OF HOW LONG A GAP BETWEEN REPLACEMENTS COULD BE ACCEPTED AND STILL CONSIDER PRESENCE "PERMANENT".

5 ON TRANSIT HE NOTED THAT THIS ISSUE WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN TERMS OF SOVIET INTERESTS. HE STATED THAT TRANSITING UNITS HAD BEEN EXCLUDED FROM DATA SOVIET SIDE INTENDED TO PROVIDE US ON THEIR ACTIVITIES. HE RESERVED HIS POSITION ON HOW LONG A SHIP COULD REMAIN IN INDIAN OCEAN AND STILL BE CONSIDERED IN TRANSIT, INDICATING THAT THIS WOULD VARY DEPENDING ON TYPE OF SHIP INVOLVED.

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HE NEITHER ACCEPTED NOR REJECTED US INFORMAL SUGGESTION OF 30 DAYS AS LIMIT FOR TRANSITING SHIPS, NOTHING POSSIBILITY OF BREAKDOWNS AS EXAMPLE WHEN THIS MIGHT NOT BE APPROPRIATE. HE NOTED FURTHER STUDY REQUIRED.

6. TYPE OF SHIPS INCLUDED AS "AUXILIARIES" NEEDS FURTHER STUDY. HE NOTED THAT CORRELATION OF COMBATANTS TO AUXILIARIES WAS DIRECTLY RELATED TO AVAILABILITY OF SHORE FACILITIES.

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DODE-00 NSC-05 COME-00 DOTE-00 EB-07 FMC-01 CG-00

DLOS-09 OES-07 MMO-01 /134 W

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P 250900Z JUN 77

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9122

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DEPT PASS TO NSC, ACDA, DOD, JCS

7. ON POSSIBILITY OF MUTUAL NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS IN AND OUT OF INDIAN OCEAN, SOVIETS HAD "NO MAJOR OBJECTIONS OF A POLITICAL NATURE." THIS IS SUBJECT FOR SERIOUS STUDY AND "SHOULD BE APPROACHED ON A PRACTICAL BASIS."

8. HE NOTED WITH SATISFACTION US FLEXIBILITY ON ISSUE OF SHIP-DAYS VERSUS TON-DAYS AND FOUND IDEA OF A COMBINED MEASURE "CERTAINLY OF INTEREST". HE NOTED THAT MEASURES OF PRESENCE SHOULD BE RELATED TO STRATEGIC SITUATION IN AREA AND WERE NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO AN "ACCOUNTANT APPROACH OF CHOOSING ONE BUTTON OR ANOTHER TO PRESS." HE AGREED THAT MEASURES SHOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES MUTUALLY.

9. HE THEN UNDERTOOK A GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION IN REGION, NOTING NEED FOR A FRANK DISCUSSION SO THAT EACH SIDE COULD UNDERSTAND STRATEGIC OUTLOOK OF OTHER.

10. MENDELEVICH, REFERRING TO "A REPORT I JUST READ," INDICATED HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT PRESIDENT CARTER WAS NOT CALLING FOR DEMILITARIZATION BUT FOR STABILIZATION AS A FIRST STEP. CONCERNING "STABILIZATION", THERE IS AN IMPORTANT DISTINCTION WHICH NEEDS  
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TO BE CLARIFIED. US SIDE IN ITS OPENING STATEMENT INDICATED THAT THERE IS NO ARMS RACE IN INDIAN OCEAN. SOVIET SIDE, HOWEVER, HAD STATED THAT "ARMS RACE IN INDIAN OCEAN HAS NOT GONE TOO FAR." THERE IS AN IMPORTANT NUANCE IN THESE TWO STATEMENTS WHICH IS MORE THAN SEMANTIC. SOVIET SIDE BELIEVES THAT AN ARMS RACE IS GOING ON TO DEVELOP US AND ALLIED SYSTEMS OF NAVAL BASES, E.G. DIEGO GARCIA, COCKBURN SOUND AND MAYOTTE (FRENCH). HE ALSO NOTED MULTILATERAL EXERCISES IN CONTEXT OF CENTO AND OUTSIDE CENTO, CITING RECENT US-FRENCH EXERCISE IN GULF OF ADEN. SOVIET ALSO SEE ELEMENTS OF AN ARMS RACE IN LARGE SCALE FORCES SUCH AS ATTACK CARRIERS IN ADJACENT AREAS SUCH AS PHILIPPINES WHICH CAN BE MOVED RAPIDLY TO BEEF UP A MILITARY PRESENCE ELSEWHERE. ARMS RACE HAS NOT GONE TOO FAR, BUT A QUESTION ARISES AS TO WHERE IT WILL LEAD.

11. MENDELEVICH THEN UNDERTOOK TO OUTLINE SOVIET STRATEGIC AIMS IN INDIAN OCEAN, NOTING THAT THESE VIEWS WERE "NOT OFFICIAL BUT REFLECTIONS OF OUR DELEGATION." MAIN PURPOSE OF SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE IS TO ENSURE SECURITY FOR TRANSIT ROUTE THAT PASSES THROUGH INDIAN OCEAN, ONLY ALL-WEATHER ROUTE LINKING FAR EASTERN AND EUROPEAN PARTS OF SOVIET UNION. IN ADDITION, SOME SHIPS ARE THERE FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND PARTICIPATION IN SPACE ACTIVITIES; BUT MAIN REASON IS TO DEFEND AND PROTECT SECURITY OF TRANSIT ROUTE. HE NOTED THAT US ALSO HAS TO PROTECT, NOT TRANSIT ROUTES BUT "LET US CALL THEM OIL ROUTES",

AND HE WOULD NOT DENY THAT. HE NOTED THAT "IT IS TRUE THAT SOME MEDIA REPORTS IN UNITED STATES EXPRESS DOUBT AS TO LEGITIMACY OF THIS" SINCE IT WOULD BE EASIER FOR SOVIETS TO STRIKE AT SOURCE OF OIL RATHER THAN IN INDIAN OCEAN. HOWEVER, HE NOTED, HE DID "NOT WANT TO REFER TO THIS NEWSPAPER SPECULATION." BUT HE IMAGINES THAT THIS SITUATION IS NOT LIMITED TO TASK OF PROTECTING OIL ROUTES BUT ALSO TENDS TO SPILL OVER. "WE BELIEVE, AND IT IS BEGINNING TO BE CONFIRMED BY FACTS, THAT UNITED STATES MAY REGARD  
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INDIAN OCEAN AS AN AREA FOR DEPLOYMENT OF STRATEGIC FORCES DIRECTED AGAINST SOVIET UNION." THERE CAN BE NOT SUCH TASK FOR SOVIET UNION IN INDIAN OCEAN. DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES IN THIS AREA WOULD REQUIRE THEIR WITHDRAWAL FROM OTHER AREAS WHERE THEY "ARE MORE USEFUL AND SERVE TO CREATE A BALANCE." USSR CANNOT STRIKE US FROM THERE.

12. WHY DO THEY SEE US AS CONTEMPLATING DEPLOYMENT OF STRATEGIC FORCES IN INDIAN OCEAN? THREE REASONS: ((1) ALREADY US HAS INTRODUCED ON A PERIODIC BASIS ATTACK CARRIERS WITH NUCLEAR ATTACK AIRCRAFT WHICH CAN REACH SOVIET UNION FROM PERSIAN GULF AND EVEN FURTHER SOUTH. (2) EXPANSION OF AIR BASE AT DIEGO GARCIA IS JUST BEGINNING BUT IS BECOMING TANGIBLE. BY 1979 (I.E., "THE DAY AFTER TOMORROW") IT WILL ACCOMMODATE B-52 BOMBERS. THIS EXPANSION IS REPORTED IN OFFICIAL SOURCES. (3) A SYSTEM OF BASES IS BEING DEVELOPED (THE MAIN ONE IS DIEGO GARCIA BUT OTHERS INCLUDE THOSE OF US ALLIES) WHICH CAN LEAD TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DEPLOYMENTS OF BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES WHICH COULD THREATEN THE USSR FROM INDIAN OCEAN. HE STRESSED WORD "CAN", NOTING THAT "THIS HAS NOT YET HAPPENED." HE NOTED THAT NONE OF THESE THREE DEVELOPMENTS CAN BE DUPLICATED BY USSR IN THAT PART OF WORLD. "WHAT WE ARE DOING IS NOT IDENTICAL TO WHAT YOU ARE DOING."

13. IN CLOSING, NEDELEVICH OFFERED SEVERAL "THOUGHTS."

- WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO "STABILIZE" SITUATION? DOES THIS MEAN THAT US DEVELOPS A CAPABILITY TO DEPLOY WHEREAS USSR HAS NO OPPORTUNITY?

- IF US PRESENCE CONTINUE TO GROW, SOVIETS MAY HAVE TO TAKE COUNTERACTIONS, THOUGH HE COULD NOT SAY WHAT OR WHERE, IN INDIAN OCEAN OR ELSEWHERE.

- INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCE OF SUCH A PROCESS WOULD BE A NEW AND COSTLY DIMENSION IN ARMS RACE. USSR WANTS TO AVOID THIS.  
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THEY CAN "STAND" THIS, BUT THEY PREFER TO AVOID IT AND THINK WE ALSO WANT TO AVOID IT.

- IF WE DO IN FACT WANT TO AVOID IT, THEN WE HAVE BASIS FOR REACHING AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, IF US WANTS AN AGREEMENT IN WHICH IT COULD CONTINUE TO BUILD UP, THEN AN AGREEMENT IS IMPOSSIBLE. "THIS IS CORE OF PROBLEM."

- USSR IS READY TO UNDERTAKE THIS LARGE TASK. "OUR HOPES HAVE NOT DISAPPEARED." WE ARE READY TO DO WHATEVER WORK IS NECESSARY. WARNKE REPLIED BY CITING THE GOAL EXPRESSED BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY TO FIRST LIMIT AND THEN REDUCE THE MILITARY PRESENCE, AND TO THEREBY AVOID AN ARMS RACE IN INDIAN OCEAN.

14. RESTRICTED SESSION SCHEDULED FOR 9:30 A.MM ON SATURDAY, JUNE 25.  
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## Message Attributes

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**TAGS:** PARM, XO, UR  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/b4d57e76-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
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